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W
hy do worker bees give up their 
own reproduction in favor of 
other offspring of the queen? Does 
this make sense from a Darwin-
ian point of view, which prescribes 
maximization of reproductive suc-
cess? Ever since Darwin, evolutionary bi-
ologists have time and again revisited this 
problem of how social behavior evolved. 
There must be some benefit to the donor in 
terms of fitness, otherwise the trait would 
vanish. However, how to evaluate this fitness 
benefit remains controversial because confu-
sion about which models to use abounds.
Most experts in evolution agree that the 
first detailed, and essentially correct, expla-
nation for altruistic behavior was given by 
Hamilton in 1964 (1). Hamilton aimed to de-
termine the conditions that allow altruistic 
behavior to spread. The altruist (the worker 
bee) cooperates by giving a benefit b to the 
recipient (other offspring of the queen) at a 
cost c to itself; both b and c are measured 
in terms of fitness, e.g., the expected num-
ber of offspring. One can trivially guess that 
b > c must hold, but this is not enough. Ham-
ilton’s insight was that relatedness (degree 
of kinship) r between donor and recipient 
must enter the equation. Thus, Hamilton’s 
rule (HR) is br > c. 
HR is derived from what many think 
in turn to be maximized in evolution: the 
inclusive fitness of an organism. Inclusive 
fitness underlies kin selection, namely, it is 
the number of offspring equivalents in the 
following sense: An actor is causally res-
ponsible for some fitness contributions to all 
other individuals whom it has helped, at the 
cost of lowering its own fitness by c. Inclu-
sive fitness is the weighted sum of all these 
additive contributions, with the weights 
being the relatedness values between the 
actor and the recipients. This approach has 
been applied far beyond social insects. For 
example, all somatic cells in a human body 
are maximally related to each other; this is 
how reproductive division of labor could 
evolve, so that only the germ cells make it 
to next generation. 
In the eyes of many, HR comes close to 
what physicists would call a natural law. 
However, Nowak et al. have argued that HR 
“almost never holds” (2). This extraordinary 
claim has created much debate. Four recent 
insightful papers (3–6) shed more light on 
the evolution of cooperation, kin selection, 
and the role of relatedness in the evolution 
of cooperation. They indicate that HR has 
no fundamental role unless interpreted in 
causal terms (3, 6), tackle issues associated 
with the notion of inclusive fitness and the 
role of relatedness in general (4), and reveal 
that group selection cannot always be re-
duced to kin selection, and vice versa (5, 6).
As Birch and Okasha (3) explain, re-
searchers have inadvertently been arguing 
about different versions of HR that are not 
directly comparable. The authors introduce 
a distinction between different versions, of 
which we consider only two: the special case 
(HRS) and the general case (HRG). These 
versions both use the same form of HR 
(br > c), but each has a different interpreta-
tion of the parameters b and c. In HRS, costs 
and benefits stem from the payoff matrix 
describing evolutionary encounters: who 
gets how much in terms of fitness upon 
meeting with partners of the same or other 
types, exactly as in Nowak et al.’s work (2). 
In contrast, HRG obtains b and c values by 
applying a statistical approach to the full 
model of a population.
If the payoffs are additive, as in Ham-
ilton’s original paper, then HRS is exact. 
Because additive payoffs are islands in an 
ocean of nonadditive ones, one may say that 
HR “never holds.” If the payoffs are nonaddi-
tive then one can always design a particular 
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rule for each case to determine the condi-
tions for cooperation to evolve. However, it 
is not ensured that a simple, elegant, and 
intuitive inequality such as HR will result. 
Other complications against mathematical 
elegance arise when taking into account the 
structure of the population, which in turn 
can require different definitions or inter-
pretations of relatedness.
An apt picture of HR can be drawn by an 
analogy (7). If Earth were flat, a two-dimen-
sional (2D) map would be absolutely accu-
rate, and a straight line drawn between two 
cities would in fact give the shortest path 
between them. However, Earth is embedded 
in three dimensions, and 2D maps, by any 
cartographic projection, cannot be fully ac-
curate. As anyone who flies on planes can 
tell, paths of jets (say, between Amsterdam 
and Boston) tend to look curved in the air-
line brochures, giving the false impression 
that jets spend more fuel and time than 
needed. But the shortest lines on a curved 
surface tend to look curved on a flat sur-
face. Despite this distortion, flat maps can 
be very useful. For example, there is little 
inaccuracy of distance between two cities 
that are close to each other (like London 
and Amsterdam). 
When scientists seek to find the right ex-
pression of relatedness so that an HR-like 
rule holds, they do something like finding 
the shortest path on a 2D map of a curved 
surface, depending on the projection used. 
Similarly, in the HRG approach (8, 9), the pa-
rameters b and c are statistical estimates and 
HR holds by construction (3, 4) because it 
is always possible to fit by regression, even 
if poorly, a linear model from a full popula-
tion model that gives b and c. Because of the 
statistical nature of HRG, these estimates of 
b and c are not causal factors. Instead, the 
estimates depend on the whole population 
(9), including its structure (who interacts 
with whom in the spatial sense), so that 
the inclusive fitness concept is neither ap-
plicable nor enlightening. Consequently, we 
do not know, for example, what would hap-
pen if the particular population structure or 
the interactions were altered. Because HRG 
builds on correlations, and correlation does 
not necessarily imply causation, the method 
is blind to certain artifacts (10). 
The fact that both HRS and HRG suf-
fer from shortcomings does not prompt 
researchers to abandon the core idea that 
genetic relatedness is nonetheless impor-
tant. HR may fail, but the effect of r can 
still be significant. In general, one should 
ask whether, in a given setting, the suc-
cess of cooperation goes up with r or not. 
Van Veelen et al. have shown recently that 
in many cases it does (4), but evolution-
ary “success” can be understood in differ-
ent ways. Take, for example, a game theory 
approach that describes whether an actor 
invests in cooperation, as in Hamilton’s (1) 
or Nowak et al.’s (2) models. Assume that 
the payoff values of the game, which ex-
press the individual fitness of cooperators 
(C) and defectors (D), are affected by their 
relatedness in a population. The first effect 
is that the rate of evolution of C, i.e., the 
velocity of increase in the relative frequency 
p of C across generations, increases with 
r, particularly when the initial cooperator 
frequency is low. That is, cooperators grow 
faster than defectors. Secondly, the range of 
initial conditions that allow cooperators to 
establish themselves may also increase with 
r. Finally, the average fitness in the popula-
tion may also go up with r (4). 
Further controversies arise because in 
some classic models, the same conclusion 
regarding the fate of the altruistic individu-
als can be reached by invoking either kin se-
lection (KS) or group selection (GS). Group 
selection acts when individuals are assorted 
into groups, interact locally (so that their 
viability depends on group composition), 
and in subsequent steps either disperse 
into a global population or randomly re-
group; the groups themselves may also 
split into “daughter” groups. Under group 
selection, fitness has an individual and a 
group component. For example, the fitness 
of an individual bird in a flock is propor-
tional to how many chicks it has; groups of 
individuals then randomly form and, upon 
migration, the size of the flock determines 
the probability of survival of the group as 
a whole. In certain cases, this partitioning 
of fitness into two levels—e.g., individual re-
production and group viability—can be post 
hoc rewritten in one-level inclusive fitness 
terms. As a result, many have concluded 
that the equivalency between kin and group 
selection (KS = GS) must be completely gen-
eral (3). 
However, interesting group selection cases 
are more complex than the minimal models 
used to argue about KS = GS, casting further 
doubts about their equivalency: For many 
populations of molecular replicators, mi-
crobes, or indeed hunter-gatherer tribes that 
split and regroup, there are no neatly sepa-
rated steps of group splitting, extinction, and 
regrouping—necessary conditions for KS = 
GS (5). These component processes can oc-
cur at any instance of continuous time in the 
different groups. In this case, Simon (5) has 
shown that inclusive fitness cannot be com-
puted without first considering group effects. 
That inclusive fitness can only be computed 
post hoc renders the kin selection approach, 
in these cases, futile. Moreover, inclusive fit-
ness analyses of asynchronous group dynam-
ics cannot provide a dynamically sufficient 
model to predict what happens in the long 
run, whereas well-constructed group selec-
tion models do exactly that (11). As Okasha 
has shown, in such cases, causal path analy-
sis (6) reveals that group fitness influences 
individual fitness directly, rather than the 
other way round. This finding reinforces the 
point that causation is more important than 
mere correlation (10).
Whether or not KS = GS is also critical 
for understanding the origin of the human 
condition. Is intergroup conflict essential for 
cooperation, as in a model of parochial altru-
ism (12), or is it not? Understanding the re-
lationship between kin and group selection 
can provide further insight into this fascinat-
ing problem.
The scope of HR, and the relationship be-
tween kin and group selection, are now much 
clearer than they were even 5 years ago. The 
latest analyses show that HR does not hold 
the fundamental role that many evolution-
ary biologists long thought it did. This has 
come at the benefit of further understanding 
the role of inclusive fitness and relatedness 
in the evolution of cooperation and altruism. 
At the same time, we have gained knowledge 
on why kin selection and group selection 
are not equivalent except in specific cases, 
with the implication that these two modes 
of selection describe different life histories. 
Regarding their occurrence in nature, more 
empirical tests, informed by the recent 
theoretical results, with careful statistics 
are needed for further progress. Genetic 
relatedness is important for social evo-
lution; HR appears to be less important, but 
other techniques can come to the rescue.  j
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